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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ATTORNEY AND CLIENT -
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
District 12, United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar
Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
The significant question presented to the United States Supreme
Court in District 12, United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois
State Bar Associatiooz was to what extent associations are constitu-
tionally protected when engaging in group legal practice.2 The
Court, which believed that the Illinois State court interpretations
of associational freedom were "too narrow,"3 proceeded to weigh the
competing interests4 involved in favor of the union. The problem
that still remains, however, is that when competing interests are
significantly different, the Court must continually "balance" these
interests to determine in whose favor the scales of justice should be
tipped.
In order to gain the proper perspective for viewing the import
of the UMW decision, it is imperative to first review the Court's two
prior decisions in the field of group legal practice. The first,
NAACP v. Button, involved the State of Virginia's attempt to ap-
ply its amended barratry statutes6 to the NAACP. It was the ex-
1389 U.S. 217 (1967).
2 "The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with
it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of
free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest" Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945). But see Justice Harlan's dissent in UMW, in
which he reiterated the views he previously set forth in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 452-55 (1963) (dissenting opinion), by stating:
the freedom of expression guaranteed against state interference by the Four-
teenth Amendment includes the liberty of individuals not only to speak but
also to unite to make their speech effective. The latter right encompasses
the right to join together to obtain judicial redress. However, litigation is
more than speech; it is conduct. And the States may reasonably regulate
conduct even though it is related to expression. 389 U.S. at 226.
3 389 U.S. at 221.
4 The Court's decision in the UM W case still leaves the question of what activities
are constitutionally protected unanswered. This is due to the Court's use of a "bal-
ancing" approach rather than an "absolute" standard when interpreting first amend-
ment cases. For a further discussion of this point, see Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S.
820, 871-74 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60-71
(1961) (dissenting opinion).
t 3 7 1 U.S. 415 (1963).
6 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 (1950), as ameoded, Va. Acts of Assem-
bly 1956, ch. 32, at 33-35. It has been said of barratry that "[t]he offense does not
consist in promoting either private suits or public prosecutions when the sole object is
the attainment of public justice or private right, but in the prostitution of these reme-
dies to mean and selfish purposes." 9 C.J.S. Barratry § 2, at 1547.(1938). See also
Golden Commissary Corp. v. Shipley, 157 A.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960).
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press purpose of the Virginia statute to make it legally impossible
for the NAACP to provide and compensate per diem staff counsel
in aiding Negro member and nonmember parties in civil rights
cases. Virginia's highest court held the NAACP guilty of "foment-
ing and soliciting legal business in which they are not parties and
have no pecuniary right or liability, and which they channel to the
enrichment of certain lawyers employed by them, at no cost to the
litigants and over which the litigants have no control."7  This, the
court said, was a violation of chapter 33 of the Virginia Code as
well as Canons 35 and 47 of the American Bar Association.' The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, construed chapter 33 of the Vir-
ginia Code to violate the first and 14th amendments "by unduly in-
hibiting protected freedoms of expression and association."9
Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, based his opinion
on the freedoms of association and expression but failed to define
what the consequences of fully exercising these rights might en-
compass. Many read the Button decision as allowing solicitation of
legal business for lawyers only where it "was a form of 'political
expression' to secure, through court action, constitutionally protected
civil rights."'" This ambiguous interpretation remained undarified
until the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Vir-
ginia State Bar" case held that constitutional protection was not
solely limited to the "civil rights"12 area.
The Trainmen case concerned a union plan to aid its members
and their families in obtaining legal redress for employment-related
accidents covered by the Federal Employers Liability Act. 3 A legal
counsel staff was maintained by the Brotherhood to recommend to
its members and their families the names of lawyers whom the un-
ion believed to be honest and competent. The Virginia State Bar
charged that the union's activities specifically violated both the
statutes relating to the unauthorized practice of law and Canons 28,
35, and 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. These Can-
7 NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 155, 116 S.E.2d 55, 66 (1960), rev'd sub nom.,
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
8 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 35 deals with soliciting clients,
through the use of lay intermediaries and id. No. 47 is concerned with assisting an
association in its unauthorized practice of law.
9 371 U.S. at 437.
10 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S.
1, 10 (1964), wherein Justice Clark, dissenting, distinguished the Button decision.
11377 U.S. 1 (1964).
12 Id. at 8.
1345 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1964).
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ons prohibited "stirring up of litigation, control or exploitation by
a lay agency of professional services of a lawyer, and aiding the un-
authorized practice of law."14
In holding that the Brotherhood's plan and activities were with-
in the protected area of free speech and free association, the Court
implicitly curtailed, by the use of constitutional immunity, the pre-
viously broad power of the bar or court to control the legal profes-
sion.'" But the Court again failed to define the exact boundaries of
constitutional protection for group legal services. 6 The Court also
failed to define what specific limitations were to be placed upon the
bar or court in implementing their conceded right to control the
profession.'" Thus, the questions left unanswered by these two de-
cisions were how broad is the right of association and what counter-
vailing State interests may justify the limitation of this right. Faced
with this question, the Court used the UMW case to reiterate its
"balancing approach" to the problem, which in essence will always
leave the issue of explicit boundaries unresolved.
The Court's process for determining which of these competing
interests will prevail, is to weigh the State's concern for high stand-
ards of legal ethics against the people's right of associational free-
dom.'" By use of this "balancing approach," the Court held, in the
UMWf case, that the competing interests of the union outweighed
those of the State. What the Court did, in effect, was to balance
the degree of ethical sin committed under present canons of legal
ethics in forming group legal services against the people's right of
associational freedom and their right of legal redress of grievances.
In UMW, the State's argument for asserting its regulatory in-
terest was based upon the potential for abuse inherent in the union's
plan.' 9 On this ground, the Illinois State Bar Association was ini-
14 377 U.S. at 6 n.10.
15 Justice Black, writing the majority opinion in the UMW case, stated:
That the States have broad power to regulate the practice of law is, of course,
beyond question .... But it is equally apparent that broad rules framed to
protect the public and to preserve respect for the administration of justice
can in their actual operation significantly impair the value of associational
freedom. 389 U.S. at 222.
Justice Harlan, in his dissent, said that States have a right to regulate "the potential
for abuse." Id. at 230.
16 See note 4 supra.
17See note 15 supra.
Is 389 U.S. at 222.
19 Compare the majority's emphasis on actual harm, id., with Justice Harlan's em-
phasis on potential harm, id. at 232-33, where he stated:
But the proper question is not whether this particular plan has in fact
caused any harm. It is, instead, settled that in the absence of any dominant
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tially successful in enjoining the plan,2" the basis of which can be
summarized as follows. The union employed an attorney on a sal-
ary basis to represent members and their dependents in connection
with their claims for personal injury or death under the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act.21 The members were advised by
the union that they could choose any attorney they wished and were
in no way compelled to use the union-provided attorney. The terms
of the attorney's employment specifically stated that his sole "obli-
gations and relations will be to and with only the several persons"
he represents.
In litigating injured union members' claims, the attorney pre-
pared his cases from the union's files and often had no personal con-
tact with the injured members until hearings were held before the
Illinois Industrial Commission. If a preheating settlement was
reached, the injured member could choose to accept the amount or
to proceed to the hearing. The full amount of any settlement or
award was paid entirely to the injured member, since the attorney's
compensation was his union-paid annual salary.
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the union's contention that
its members had a right, protected by the first and 14th amend-
ments, to join together and assist one another in the assertion of
their legal rights by collectively hiring an attorney to handle their
claims.23 Illinois' highest court interpreted the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in NAACP v. Button to be concerned pre-
dominantly with litigation that could be characterized as a form of
political expression.24 The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the
opposing interest a State may enforce prophylactic measures reasonably cal-
culated to ward off foreseeable abuses, and that the fact that a specific activ-
ity has not yet produced any desirable consequences will not exempt it from
regulation.
See Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 222-25 (1949); Hoopeston Can-
ning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 321-22 (1943).
20 Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. District 12, UMW, 35 Il1. 2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503
(1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
2 1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138-72 (1963).
22 389 U.S. at 220.
23 35 Ill. 2d at 112, 219 N.E.2d at 503. When applicable statutes have been ab-
sent, State courts have claimed that their power to supervise the bar derives from the
common law. Using the common law as its power base, these courts have drawn and
enforced standards of professional conduct closely related to the prohibitions found in
the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics. See, e.g., In re Maclub
of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936). See generally H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHics 26-30, 35-48 (1953).
24 389 U.S. at 221. The Button decision can be read to indicate that first amend-
ment principles only protect those associations that seek to litigate issues of "public
interest," since the Court dwelt for considerable length on how suits prompted and
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Trainmen case as not extending to protect plans involving the ex-
plicit hiring of an attorney by unions for their members. Both of
these interpretations were considered too "narrowly limited 2" by
Justice Black in his majority opinion in UMW.
In rejecting the Illinois court's interpretation of Button and
Trainmen, the Court held that the States previously, practically un-
bridled usage of "prophylactic" rules of legal ethics26 was no longer
acceptable. The Court stated that it was "equally apparent that the
broad rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect for
the administration of justice can in their actual operation significant-
ly impair the value of associational freedom."2
The UMW decision reflects the Court's awareness of the pos-
sible evils of group practice. Consequently, this decision was care-
fully worded to show that the Court recognized that group practice
of law arrangements might sometimes be constitutionally restricted
if there was a compelling State interest in regulating a particular
plan.2
8
The Supreme Court, in UMW, discussed the dangers of baseless
litigation and conflicting interests between the association and indi-
vidual litigants as being far too speculative to justify the broad
remedy invoked in the Button case.29 In the same vein of reasoning,
the Trainmen case is referred to in terms of the "theoretical imagin-
able divergence""0 between the union's interest and that of the in-
dividual litigant-member. If such a split in interest occurred, the
union's power to cut off the attorney's referral business could induce
the attorney to sacrifice the interest of his client.31 But the Court
answered these problems in the UMW context by stating:
In both cases, there was absolutely no indication that the theoreti-
cally imaginable divergence between the interests of union and
member ever actually arose in the context of a particular lawsuit;
indeed in the present case the Illinois Supreme Court itself de-
brought by the NAACP were ingrained with constitutional principles. See note 10
supra & accompanying text.
25 389 U.S. at 221.
26 See note 15 supra.
27 389 U.S. at 222.
28 Id.; cf. id. at 226 (dissenting opinion). See also 371 U.S. at 438.
29 389 U.S. at 223.
30 Id. at 224.
31 One of the stated purposes of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was to en-
force the PELA so that members could receive compensation for their injuries. 377
U.S. at 3. This purpose coincided exactly with the members' interests and thus served
to strengthen the Court's usage of the term "theoretically imaginable divergence."
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scribed the possibilities of conflicting interests as, at most, "con-
ceivabl[e]."32
The fears raised by the Button, Trainmen, and UMW cases are
based on the belief that an organized group which provides legal
services might interfere with the attorney-client relationship,33 or
somehow attempt to control the lawyer's activities in some method
harmful to the client."4 Or, even if the organization does not con-
sciously do either of these things, there is the possibility that the
mere existence of the organization will force the lawyer to divide
his loyalties between the organization and his client.35
These fears are not baseless for there should be concern that a
lawyer does perform in the most effective manner possible for his
client. Although it is doubtful, an attorney might jeopardize his
client's interests because of external pressures exerted by an associa-
tion, and therefore some State regulation may be desirable. Con-
32389 U.S. at 224. The union and its attorney were charged with soliciting cli-
ents through the use of lay intermediaries and assisting an association in its unauthorized
practice of law, which are violations of Canons 35 and 47, respectively. See note 8
supra.
Yet, the UMW case raises only a minimal amount of ethical violations. A more
complete listing of ethical violations would include: Maintenance, which can be de-
fined as a layman furnishing money to permit a lawyer to provide, in part, costs and
expenses involved in carrying on litigation for a third party, Kane v. Sesac, Inc, 54
F. Supp. 853, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). See generally Radin, Maintenance by Champerty,
24 CALIF. L. REV. 48-57 (1935); champerty, which is a bargain to divide the proceeds
of litigation between the owner of the liquidated claim and a party supporting or en-
forcing the litigation, Draper v. Zebec, 219 Ind. 362, 37 N.E.2d 952, 956 (1942);
barratry, see note 6 supra; solicitation, inciting litigation, channeling, advertising, see
ABA CANONS OF ETHics Nos. 27, 28, 40, 43, 46; unauthorized practice, see id. No.
47; control of litigation, see id.; Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n,
167 Va. 327, 329, 189 S.E. 153, 159 (1937); lay intermediary, see ABA CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 35; commercialization, see ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcs, OPINIONS, No. 8, at 71, 75 (1925); corporate practice, see In re Co-operative
Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910); and ambulance chasing, see In re
Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186, 190, 196 N.E.2d 301, 303 (1957); Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn.
App. 63, 82, 260 S.W.2d 379, 387 (1952).
33 The editors of the American Bar Association Journal voiced their displeasure
with the UMW case because they believed the decision would destroy the close rela-
tionship between attorney and client. They grudgingly concluded, "[tjhe decision is
here for us to live with." A New Dispensation, 54 A.B.A.J. 264 (1968); see text ac-
companying notes 21-23 supra. See also People ex tel. Courtney v. Association of Real
Estate Tax-Payers, 354 Ill. 102, 109, 187 N.E. 823, 826 (1933); In re Maclub of Amer-
ica, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 49, 3 N.E.2d 272, 274 (1936).
a4 Justice Harlan made such a conflict of interest argument in his dissent in NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 460-63 (1963). See also Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc.
v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 339, 189 S.E. 153, 159 (1937); ABA CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHIcs No. 35.
3 5 See Note, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lay Organizations Providing the
Services of Attorneys, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1334, 1344-45 (1959). See also In re Co-
operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483-84, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910); Information Opinion
of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 36 A.B.A.J. 677 (1950).
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sequently, some rules of legal ethics are necessary and are based on
truly sound policies that have relevance to present-day legal prac-
tice.3" But it is equally important to note that when these rules of
legal ethics are broadly, capriciously, arbitrarily, or indiscriminantly
applied by bar associations, they prohibit as many beneficial prac-
tices as they do harmful ones. Conversely, it would be platitudinous
to reject the rules of legal ethics by merely stating that times have
changed.
Surely the holding in UMW is not a wholesale dismissal of the
rules of legal ethics nor is it a usurpation of the State's power to
rule and regulate its own bar. In his dissent Justice Harlan stated
that "[iln the absence of demonstrated arbitrary or discriminatory
regulation, state courts and legislatures should be left to govern
their own Bars, free from interference by this Court."3  But this
advice, if faithfully followed, would vitiate the reason for the Court's
present sojourn into the land of group legal services, namely the
"balancing" of the competing interests of the State against those
of associational freedom to determine which interests will prevail.
The UMW case has reaffirmed the hope of those who nourish
on the idea that the present rules of legal ethics will be changed to
reflect the values of our contemporary legal profession. Those who
have advocated change look upon present-day legal practice as be-
ing inappropriately guided by the rules of legal ethics promulgated
by our ancestors.38 For example, rules prohibiting champerty, main-
tenance, and barratry are some of the most frequently relied upon
rules to outlaw group legal practice. In essence, the repeated use
of these rules strikes at the heart of the group legal services purpose,
that is, to help people prosecute claims they might not otherwise be
able or inclined to prosecute themselves.
Yet, it is important to note that the attitude of our society has
vastly changed from originally opposing speculation in litigation,
as evidenced by the rules prohibiting champerty, maintenance, and
barratry. For example, the practice of assigning choses in action
3 0 For example, rules preventing maintenance, champerty, and barratry can be used
to protect harassed litigants and to protect against vexatious and oppressive litigation.
But in order to truly serve these functions, the rules must not simply provide wholesale
prohibitions for such abuses, but should be reformulated in terms of the motive of the
maintainer and the outcome of the litigation. In prohibiting such abuses, the courts
must change their emphasis from the act of maintaining a suit to the motive or effect
of bringing a suit.
37 389 U.S. at 234.
38The rules of legal ethics as they evolved from England and Colonial America
were, for the most part, rules of etiquette aimed more at keeping the legal profession
congenial than at benefitting the public. H. DRIKER, sftpra note 23, at 210-12.
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would fit within the definition of champerty but assigning choses
is now common practice.39 Another example is contingent fee con-
tracts which are also a violation of the laws of champerty, but which
are increasingly being accepted by our society 0
The Button, Trainmen, and UMW decisions serve to further il-
lustrate our contemporary society's changing attitudes towards group
legal practice. When these cases are viewed together, it is quite
clear that members of an association can now act as a unit to pro-
mote a particular interest of that group or the individuals compris-
ing such a group. But it is in light of these recent changes in group
legal practice that the UMW case most distinctly fails. The Court
should have used UMW as a vehicle to permit a plan by which law-
yers are provided to assist members of an association with all their
legal problems.41 Specifically, the Supreme Court has failed to use
the UMW case to expressly denounce ABA Canon 35 which says:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which inter-
venes between client and lawyer.
... A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such
as an association, club, or trade organization, to render legal ser-
vices in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is in-
terested, but this employment should not include the rendering of
legal services to the members of such an organization in -respect
to their individual affairs.42
It must be presumed that the State bars are cognizant of the fact
that their basic organizational forms of practice must change in re-
sponse to society's long felt need for legal aid.43 What the UMWF
case seems to imply is that these changes will be foisted upon the
39 Radin, supra note 32, at 48-57; Winfield, Assignment of Choses in Action in
Relation to Maintenance and Champerty, 35 L.Q. REv. 143 (1919).
40 J. COHEN, THE LAw: BUsINESS OR PROFESSION? 205-10 (1919); G. COsTIGAN,
CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND ITS ETHIcs 643-
49 (2d ed. 1933); H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at 176.
4 1 The Hotel Trades Council in New York City is a good example of group prac-
tice covering a wide range of rights. A union member can request advice on various
matters including landlord-tenant law and income tax problems. Advisors, without
formal legal training but with some general knowledge of the area of law upon which
they advise, offer advice on certain types of legal questions. Legal matters on which
the lay advisors feel inadequate to give advice are referred to the attorney employed by
the union. See N.Y. Times, April 10, 1965, at 31, col. 2.
4 2 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS No. 35 (emphasis added).
43 Thirty-five years ago Weihofen posed a question that the bars are still facing
today; "Why is it that individuals may band together to provide themselves with cheaper
insurance, cheaper groceries, higher wages, better prices, easier credit, low taxes, better
health, - everything, except better or cheaper legal advice and aid?" Weihofen,
"Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social Utility, 2 U. CHI. L. REV.
119, 128 (1933).
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bars by the United States Supreme Court, rather than worked out by
the State bars themselves.4"
If the UMW case has failed to make new innovations in the area
of group legal practice, it may nevertheless be considered successful
by illustrating the dire need for change in this field.45 In UMW,
the Court has implied that the services of a lawyer should be equal-
ly available to associations" as well as to individuals. If profession-
al limitations block this path, then the Court, upon "balancing" the
competing interests of State and association, will, in most instances,
find in favor of associational freedom. Ultimately, the Court may
determine that group legal services provided for all the legal prob-
lems of an associational member contains sufficient merit to justify
tipping its "balancing" scales in his direction. Unfortunately, the
UMW case does not stand for this much desired interpretation."'
DAviD S. DuBiN
4 4 A good illustration of this problem is the experience of the American Medical
Association. The AMA attempted, without success, to prevent the growth of group
practice, causing great injury to itself and its members. See American Medical Ass'n
v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1942).
4 5 Thirty years ago it was said that "If]he time has come to be bold in striking out
along new paths of group effort which, if properly safeguarded, will not impair either
the traditional independence of the lawyer or the dignity of the profession." Special
Committee on Economic Conditions of the Bar, 63 A.B.A. REP. 390, 391-92 (1938).
4 6 The groups that are being denied their legal existence satisfy "an unfulfilled
public need for legal services," and at a lower cost. Progress Report of the Committee
on Group Legal Services, 39 CAL. ST. B.J. 639, 652-59 (1964).
4 7 An affirmative analysis of the need for group legal services can be found in
Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer
and the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.LA.L REv. 438 (1965).
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